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happen to think is the best interest of the child. It is socially dangerous to deny the custody of a child to a parent who is suited to the
trust, and precedent will not justify the action of a court which so
interferes with natural relationships, unless the parent has voluntarily
and expressly parted with his rights, and cannot be heard to complain.
"It is one of the cardinal principles of nature and of law that
... the father ... if able to support the child in his own style of
life, and of good moral character, cannot, without the most shocking injustice, be deprived of the privilege by anyone whatever...
It is not enough to consider the interest of the child alone."-"
The above quotation, substituting only the word "parent" for
"father", expresses the law in Kentucky as defined by the better reasoned cases and by statute. It is earnestly submitted that the distinction between "contract" and "non-contract" cases should be rigidly
maintained, and the rule that the welfare of the infant is the controlling
consideration should be applied only in those cases in which the parent
has contracted away his rights, and is seeking to regain custody of
his child despite the contract.
Jo MV.FERGusoN
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAX-INTEREST IN JOINT TENANCY
PASSING BY SURVIVORSHIP
Plaintiff and decedent held certain stocks, bonds, and real estate
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Plaintiff paid under protest
an inheritance tax on one-half of the joint estate and now seeks to have
the State Auditor issue a warrant to him for the amount so paid. Held:
The tax was valid. Thus, the statute" providing that the property held
by joint tenants and payable to the survivor upon the death of one
should be deemed a transfer of one half in the same manner as tho
held by them as tenants in common and bequeathed or devised to the
surviving tenant by the deceased tenant by will was held constitutional.
DuBois Admr. v. Shannon, 275 Ky. 516, 122 S. W. (2d) 103 (1938).
The principal contention of the plaintiff was that the law only
covered transfers by devise and intestate succession, and, since this
was a transfer by survivorship, it did not come within the statute.2
But the inheritance tax law expressly covers the situation presented
in this case.2 Even if it did not, the transfer of an interest in a joint
estate might be taxable as a "deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift. . . .
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death
of the grantor or donor". The court did not mention this section,
but it seems that it could have been cited to meet plaintiff's contention.
2'Verser

v. Ford et al., 37 Ark. 27, 29 (1881).
1Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, Sec. 4281a-1, subd. 4.
Same section in 1936 edition, 4281a-15.
2275 Ky. 516, 518, 122 S. W. (2d) 103, 104 (1938).
2
Supra note 1.
' Kentucky Statutes, 1930 Edition, Sec. 4281a-1, subd. 1.

CASE COMMENTS
Such a provision has been held sufficient basis for the imposition of a
tax upon the transfer at death of an interest in a joint estate.5
There are three bases for the holding in this ease. The first is that
even tho the property passes by survivorship, under the agreement
between the parties, there is really a shifting of economic benefit at the
death of one of the parties." This is a reason generally given on this
point,' but it is hardly an answer to plaintiff's contention. The court
might also have said that since the legislature can abolish altogether
the incident of survivorship in joint estates,8 it can certainly abolish
it for the purpose of taxation. Another basis for the decision is the
broad scope of the power of taxation. The legislature can tax almost
any kind of transfer, ' particularly transfers to take effect after
death." A third basis is the necessity of such a provision as this to
prevent evasion.' This is an excellent reason for this particular case,
but it would not be at all applicable if the joint tenancy were created
before the passage of any act taxing it. Since the statute now in force
does not contain the provision that was in the former one (the one
under which this case was decided) limiting the taxation to property
rights vested after the passage of the act' 3 and under the existing statute it Is possible for estates created before the passage of any act to bie
taxed, the court might very well have omitted this as a reason. Instead,
it is the only reason which it takes the trouble to give in its own words.
The decision is in line with decisions in other statesO' and in the
federal courts, which have gone much further in upholding a more com5
Re Orvis, 223 N. Y. 1, 119 N. E. 88, 3 A- L. R. 1636 (1918); contra,
In re Kurnsey's Estate, 177 Calif. 211, 170 Pac. 402 (1918).
0275 Ky. 516, 522-3, 122 S. W. (2d) 103, 106.
'Tyler v. U. S. 497, 503 (1930); 80 Pa. L. Rev. 921, 922 (1932);
44 Harv. L. Rev. 130, 131 (1930).
8Kentucky Statutes, Sec. 2348.
'Cooley, The Law of Taxation (1924, 4th ed.) Sec. 57.
10"right and authority.... to tax any transfer of property that, it
deemed advisable to tax . . ." 275 Ky. 516, 523, 122 S. W. (2d) 103, 106.
"26 R. C. L. See. 173, cited in opinion in principal case.
""Any other holding with respect to the taxability of such interests, not held as natural rights, would serve to defeat the inheritance
and succession tax law and would clearly open up an avenue of escape
from the payment of a tax imposed upon property passing by will or
descent through conveying property through joint tenancies, whereby
the Interest of the dying joint tenant would be passed to the survivor
by operation of law and not by will or intestate succession." 275 Ky.
516, 526, 122 S. W. (2d) 103, 108.
"3Last phrase in Kentucky Statutes Sec. 4281a-1, subd. 1 is not
included in present statute which was the basis for the decision in
Commonwealth v. Merritt's Exr., 210 Ky. 779, 276 S. W. 802 (1925).
14"Marble v. Jackson, 245 Mass. 504, 139 N. E. 442 (1923); In re
Dolbeer's Estate, 226 N. Y. 623, 123 . E. 381 (1919); Tax Commission
of Ohio v. Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 361, 166 N. E. 352 (1929) ; In re Ray's
Will, 188 Wise. 180, 205 N. W. 917 (1925); but see Blodgett v. Union
New Haven Trust Co., 11 Conn. 165, 149 Atl. 790 (1930) (estate not
taxable where right of survivorship created separately); In re Haggerty's Estate, 311 Pa. 503, 166 Atl. 580 (1933) (not taxable because of
wording of statute--"shall be deemed, prima facie, a transfer . . .").
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plete and more complicated statute.5 The result is a desirable one.
Taxation is a practical matter, and the common law theory that a right
is extinguished and nothing transferred should not prevail when the
actual result is that the survivor has an exclusive ownership where
Bmrvm GmriurT
formerly he shared it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EXERCISE OF THE GOVERNOR'S VETO
OF AN ACCOMPANYING MESSAGE.-NECESSITY
ARNETT v. MEREDITH.
The Kentucky Legislature passed an act' which was sent to the
governor for his approval. He wrote on the bill these words: "This bill
is hereby vetoed." The attorney-general, believing the governor had not
legally exercised his right of veto, demanded a copy of the act from the
secretary of state. The request was refused and a declaratory judgment
action was filed to compel delivery of the act to the public printer.
The lower court sustained the plaintiff's petition, holding that the
governor had failed to legally exercise his veto power in not assigning
his reasons for vetoing the bill. Defendant appealed. Held: Judgment
affirmed. A veto message of the governor is not complete, therefore
1 Tyler v. U. S., 281 U. S. 497 (1930) (tenancy by entirety created
after passage of act taxable); Phillips v. Dime Trust & S. D. Co.,
284 U. S. 160 (1931), noted 32 Col. L. Rev. 148 (1932) (tenancy by
entirety created after passage of first act but before existing one taxable); Gwinn v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 287 U. S. 224 (1932), noted
21 Calif. L. Rev. 286 (1933) (Joint estate created before passage of any
act taxable); Griswald v. Helvering, 290 U. S. 56 (1933), noted 32
Mich. L. Rev. $68 (1934) (joint estate created before passage of act
taxable); U. S. v. Robertson, 183 Fed. 711 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910) (tenancy
by entirety created after passage of act taxable); Third Nat. Bank &
Trust Co. v. White, 45 F. (2d) 911 (1930), aff'd 287 U. S. 577 (1932),
noted 46 Harv. L. Rev. 718 (1933) (entire value of property held in
tenancy by entirety created before passage of any act taxable);
O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 60 F. (2d) 235 (1932,
C. C. A. 6th) (entire estate created after passage of first act but before
existing one taxable. This ease is interesting in connection with the
principal case because it arose in Ky. and involves our statutes on
joint tenancy); White v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 64 F. (2d) 119
(C. C. A. 8th, 1933) (joint estate created before passage of act taxable);
Putnam v. Burnett, 63 F. (2d) 457 (Ct. of App., D. of C., 1933) (tenancy
by entirety created before passage of any act taxable); Robinson v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 63 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) (same);
Clarke v. Welch, 7 F. Supp. 595 (S. D. Calif., 1933) (entire value of
joint estate taxable); Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F. (2d) 548 (Ct. of
App., D. of C., 1935) (amount contributed by survivor determined of
amount taxable); Dimock v. Corwin, 19 F. Supp. 56 (F. D. N. Y., 1937)
(entire value of joint estate taxable); Foster v. Commissioner of Int.
Rev., 90 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (same); Sheets v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 95 F. (2d) 727 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (no consideration given so whole joint estate taxable).
"Acts, 1938, c. 275, amending and re-enacting Section 551 of Ky.
Stat. (Carroll, 1936), which is a part of the chapter dealing with
private corporations.
For text of the statute as amended, see Baldwin's Ky. Stat. Supp.,
May, 1938, c. 32, Section 551.

